Dom.) that " prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,' 'oris' (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which sense Augustine [ Rabanus, De Univ. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do what is best." For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. " Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes. I answer that, According to Cassiodorus is spoken reason. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the appetitive, but of the intellective power. x) that "to pray is to speak." Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appetitive power. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations. To these a third may be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown. Of these the first is "the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis," whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Therefore prayer belongs to the appetitive power. iii): "It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by love which belongs to the appetitive power. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also. Now it is the desire that is heard by God, according to Psalm 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive power. Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power? Do sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? Īrticle 1.Is prayer proper to the rational creature?.The seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer.Should we ask for temporal things when we pray?.Should we ask for something definite when we pray?.Is prayer an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power?.
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